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Financial Dependence, Formal Credit, and Informal Jobs: 
New Evidence from Brazilian Household Data
* 
 
This paper examines a much overlooked link between credit markets and formalization: since 
access to bank credit typically requires compliance with tax and employment legislation, firms 
are more likely to incur such formalization costs once bank credit is more widely available at 
lower cost; if so, well-functioning credit markets help foster formal employment at the 
expense of informal jobs. We gauge the relevance of this credit channel using the Rajan-
Zingales measure of financial dependence and a difference-in-differences approach applied 
to household survey data from Brazil – a large emerging market where substantial changes 
in banking system depth and formalization ratios have taken place and for which consistent 
data exists. Our results show that formalization rates increase with financial deepening and 
the more so in sectors where firms are typically more dependent on external finance. We also 
decompose shifts in aggregate formalization into those within each firm size category and 
those associated with changes in firm size, and find that financial deepening significantly 
explains the former but not so much the latter. 
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1. Introduction 
Two basic tenets command considerable consensus in the  financial  and economic 
development literatures. One is that financial development is good for economic growth 
(Levine, 1997; Beck, Levine, and Loyaza, 2000). This because well-functioning financial 
markets make it easier for firms to attract financing for investment needs, and this is 
particularly crucial  in  sectors where productivity gains are potentially  high  but high 
dependence on external finance is a potential constraint (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). To 
the extent that the development of formal credit markets is hindered in countries with 
unsound economic policies, deficient property rights and law enforcement (La Porta et 
al., 1997; Johnson et al., 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 2003), the expansion of such high 
productivity sectors and of higher productivity but financially dependent firms therein 
will then be curbed; hence economic growth will suffer, all else constant. 
 
The other basic tenet is that informality of firms and of employment arrangements — 
broadly understood as the lack of compliance with taxes and regulatory provisions — is 
bad for growth. As shown in a host of recent studies, informality tends to undermine 
allocative efficiency as well as firm-level productivity, leading to under-investment and 
lower total factor productivity (Farrell 2006; Perry et al 2007; Levy, 2008; La Porta and 
Shleifer, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Further, to the extent that informality shrinks 
national tax bases and induces  higher compensatory taxes to be  levied  on formal 
business, there is a perverse feedback from the prevalence of informality to higher   3 
taxation which reinforces the incentives to go informal.
2
Notwithstanding  this substantial  body of literature on  the  links between financial 
development and economic growth on the one hand, and on informality and productivity 
growth on the other, there has been – to the best of our knowledge – a striking dearth of 
studies  on  the links between the functioning of formal credit markets and labor 
formalization.
 Thus, the adverse effects of 
informality on economy-wide productivity and growth can easily snowball, making it a 
pressing policy issue in many countries. This can be particularly so in times of financial 
distress, when formal employment falters, tax collection efforts step up, and incentives to 
evade and go informal thus thrive. 
 
3
                                                 
2 See e.g. Djankov et al. (2002) for cross-country evidence linking high taxes, informality, and productivity 
growth. It highlights the positive relationship between high taxes on formal business and the size of the 
informal sector on the one hand, and the negative relationship between the size of the informal sector and 
per capita income gap relative to the US on the other. One form of compensatory tax which Djankov et al. 
(2002) do not consider, however, and which was widely practiced in the past is the inflation tax. Insofar as 
the inflation tax affects both formal and informal business, it does not per se foster tax evasion by formal 
business. Yet, to the extent that high and chronic inflation curbs financial development, it tends to foster 
informality via the very credit channel mechanism that we examine in this paper.  
3 For instance, in a widely cited Journal of Economic Literature survey on informality by Schneider and 
Enste (2000), no attention is paid to the financial development and the credit channel mechanism that we 
discuss in this paper. Instead, as in much of literature on informality, emphasis on is placed on the roles of 
taxation, employment regulations and a variety of other institutional factors. 
  One  might  conjecture that such links can  be  quite important  once 
informality is viewed as resulting from decisions by optimizing agents on the costs and 
benefits of going informal as in standard models (see Straub, 2007 and various references 
therein). This is because the cost of remaining either an unregistered firm or a registered 
firm in breach of tax obligations is that of having either limited or no access whatsoever 
to formal credit markets (cf. Fanjzylber et al., 2006; Gatti and Honorati, 2008; IDB, 
2009).  After all,  to be able to borrow from banks or from  other regulated financial 
intermediaries a firm typically needs not only to be formally registered (or in some cases   4 
legally incorporated as a limited liability company), but also comply with considerable 
information requirements about its balance sheet and income flows so as to allow some of 
the usual information intensive monitoring of its activities by banks (cf. Fama, 1985). If 
anything, such requirements for tapping formal credit markets are likely to have become 
more stringent in recent years, as developments in communications and data gathering 
technology allow governments to pool and cross information from different enforcement 
agencies and thus more effectively clamp down on illegal borrowing and lending 
practices and the attendant tax evasion associated with informality.
4
This paper examines  whether  such  opportunity  costs  may be empirically relevant.  
Specifically, we test two main hypotheses. First, we examine whether and to which extent 
such a  “credit channel” can explain  aggregate  variations in formal vs. informal 
employment over and above other driving forces of formality, such as overall economic 
growth and tighter  regulatory  enforcement.  Second,  we examine whether this credit 
 Moreover, potential 
incentives for formalization  via  such a  “credit channel” can also  “bite”  through  the 
employee’s own optimizing behavior. For the lower the cost of bank credit, the greater 
the incentives for workers to take on formal jobs or demand legalization of their current 
employment situation, since having legal proof of steady earnings should allow better 
terms of access to credit more generally. In short, from the viewpoint of both the demand 
and the supply of formal jobs, financial development would tend to shrink the relative 
size of the informal sector.  
 
                                                 
4 In the particular case of developing countries where public banks play an extensive (and sometime almost 
exclusive) role in providing credit to smaller and medium sized firms, such enforcement is likely to be even 
stronger. This is because the government (as the majority or only equity owner of such financial 
intermediaries) has an obvious incentive to cross-check information with regard to tax evasion and arrears 
with social security and, based on those records, restrict or deny altogether access to formal credit.   5 
channel works mainly through its effect within specific size categories and/or by shifting 
the composition of employment  between  firm sizes. Scrutinizing  these  effects  is 
important  to understand the main  mechanisms through  which  financial development 
drives formalization. For instance, better access to credit among smaller firms (which are 
usually more credit constrained than larger firms) may lead them to grow, shifting into 
larger size segments of the market and leaving their previous size segment more 
dominated by smaller informal firms. If so, access to credit may well increase informality 
in the lower segments of the firm size distribution. But, it may also be the case that 
greater access to cheaper credit  disproportionally  benefits smaller firms, giving them 
greater incentive to formalize. Looking at  such size-related effects may allow us to 
discern these possibilities  and  relate our findings to a  sizeable literature on credit 
constraints and firm size. This is a matter of great analytical as well as practical interest 
since the prevalence of small business policies in many countries is predicated on the 
very basis of such constraints.  
 
Our empirical analysis rests on four pillars. One is the definition of informality. We focus 
on formal employment – defined as those jobs in compliance with registration regulations 
and social security contributions— as our key measure of informality. We do so because 
this  is  a readily available measure from household surveys,  and  one which has a 
fundamental advantage over others: workers do not have obvious incentives to report that 
they are formal when they are informal, as opposed to firms’ incentives to answer similar 
questions (since hefty penalties for non-compliance can be imposed on firms). Moreover, 
it is also quite a general measure of informality since the share of formal employment in   6 
total employment  is often highly (negatively)  correlated with other economy-wide 
measures of informality (IDB, 2009).   
 
The second pillar of our testing methodology is the use of the classic measure of financial 
dependence advanced by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The basic idea is the existence of 
sectors which are structurally more dependent on external finance than others (using the 
US as the benchmark for building such a cross-sectional ranking). If so, such sectors and 
firms therein are the ones standing to benefit the most from an expansion of credit supply 
or  financial deepening broadly defined. Hence the incentives to formalize should be 
higher in those sectors relative. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the 
Rajan-Zingales measure of financial dependence is used in the context of an analysis on 
the determinants of informality.  
 
Third, we focus on bank credit. We do so because banks are by far the most important 
class of regulated financial intermediaries in emerging markets and developing countries 
regarding the provision of external credit to firms, and they remain so in many developed 
countries as well. If the postulated links between the depth of the banking system (what 
we will broadly call “financial deepening”) and informality are significant, one should 
thus expect that for countries and/or periods in which the supply of bank credit is lower 
or  subject to more frictions – resulting in high intermediation spreads and lending costs 
that are highly dependent on the firm’s collateral – the opportunity cost of informality 
would be lower, all else constant; hence the share of informal jobs in total employment 
should be higher. Conversely, as the banking system becomes more efficient and firms   7 
have better terms of access to formal credit (including not being rationed out of formal 
credit markets altogether due to  adverse selection or  collateral constraints), overall 
formality should be higher.  
 
Finally, we focus on Brazil for three reasons. One is data availability. Among developing 
countries, Brazil has one of the most thorough household surveys (the Pesquisa Nacional 
por Amostra de Domicilios,  PNAD) with a wealth of employment data which is 
nationally representative and allows meaningful comparisons over time. In Brazil, there 
is also evidence of a  very high correlation between a firm’s registration, its tax 
compliance status, and its compliance with social security contributions (Carpio and 
Pagés, 2009). This makes data on social security and labor registration compliance from 
the PNAD a reasonably accurate indicator of degree of firm-level formalization in the 
economy at large. Other Brazilian macroeconomic data that we employ as additional 
controls in our testing methodology are also deemed to be consistently measured vis-a-
vis their respective counterparts in some other developing countries. All this contributes 
to the reliability of our results. 
 
Another important reason to focus on Brazil is the combination of substantial shifts in the 
formal/informal composition of employment and in the expansion and cost of bank credit 
over the years, what facilitates the identification of the effects at work. Last but not least, 
Brazil is an interesting case study from a policy experiment viewpoint. This is because it 
has combined in recent years financial liberalization with conservative macroeconomic 
and financial policies which sought to keep inflation low and stable and banks solidly   8 
liquid (through high reserve requirements and stringent capital regulations). One of the 
main visible effects of this combination has been an expansion of credit supply well in 
excess of GDP growth  and  declining intermediation spreads  –  only temporarily 
interrupted by the global financial crisis in late 2008.
5
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections as follows. Section 2 and 3 below 
describe the data and main stylized facts, including a decomposition of “between” and 
“within” effects behind  changes in formalization rates.  Section 4  lays out our 
 If such rapid financial deepening 
did contribute to a significant increase in formalization rates, this would be suggestive of 
a potentially important dividend of policies that combine the efficiency gains of financial 
liberalization (in terms of the availability and cost of domestic credit) with prudential 
regulations and conservative macro policies. 
 
To preview our results, the paper finds evidence of a credit-formalization channel at 
work:  formalization has been more pronounced in economic activities that are more 
financially dependent. We also highlight  that a main conduit is through shifts in the 
formality rate within each firm size category, particularly among firms who employ labor 
other than the owner’s own. To a lesser extent, we also find some evidence that financial 
deepening shifts the composition away from self-employment and towards larger firms.  
 
                                                 
5 The positive effect of financial liberalization on bank credit to GDP and financial deepening more broadly 
is clearly not a unique feature of the Brazilian experience but holds quite generally. See Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad (2005, table 2) for evidence spanning 95 countries. Bekaert et al. (2005) also find that while 
financial liberalization predicts additional financial development, the decision to liberalize does not seem to 
be influenced by the degree of financial development and can thus be taken as broadly exogenous to it. This 
lends further support to the exogeneity assumption underpinning our results as discussed below.   9 




As discussed in the introduction, this paper adopts an employment-based measure of 
formality which has the advantage of being less prone to misrepresentation and reliably 
tracked  from household data. In addition, this measure is useful because it is highly 
correlated with the formality status of a firm: unregistered firms cannot enroll their 
workers in social security, although there may be some registered firms that do not enroll 
their workers in social security because they are only in partial compliance with 
regulations. In this regard, it is possible that some firms take steps toward formalizing 
their activities but have not fully regularized their labor force. If anything, this implies 
that our measure may lead us to find lower effects of bank credit on formalization than if 
we were using firm registration as the measure of formality.  
 
We work with two alternative definitions of formal employment. One is to define as 
formal  those workers with  a formal employment contract (“carteira assinada”).  This 
arrangement denotes the fact that to register a worker, employers need to make an entry 
in a pocketsize booklet (“carteira”) that all workers must have. The other defines formal 
workers as those who report contributing to social security. While there is typically a 
tight match between the two, this need  not  be  one-to-one. This is because there are 
workers who are not formal employees of a private firm, government, or other institution 
and still contribute to social security either because they have their own business (self-  10 
employed) or form a cooperative with other workers. In the event, the correlation 
between these two alternative measures of formalization has been quite tight in Brazil.
6
The PNAD contains information on whether workers are self-employed (firms of one 
person), work in firms of 2-10 employees,  or  in firms of more than 10 employees. 
Whether this size division may seem quite restrictive it should be noted that the large 
majority of establishments in Latin America are very small, with between 80-90 percent 
of manufacturing establishments below 10 employees (IDB, 2009)
  
 
Data on formal employment is obtained from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicilios (PNAD), the main Brazilian household survey which employs a consistent 
measurement methodology  for the years 2002-2007.  This survey is nationally 
representative and contains information of an average of 394.000 individuals in 118.000 
households each year, covering all sectors of economic activity. The sample used here 
corresponds to salaried and self employed individuals between 15-65 years old who work 
in non-agricultural activities. Employers, domestic workers, military personnel,  and 
unpaid workers are excluded.   
 
7
Cross sectional information on employment is aggregated at the sector level, at a 2 digit 
of aggregation (ISIC rev3) to construct formalization ratios by sector and size category 
computed as total number of formal workers divided by total number of workers in a 
given sector and size category. In addition, we also compute the share of employment in 
.  
 
                                                 
6 Data reported in Table 1 on the growth of formalization rates across sectors for the period 2002-2007 
yield a correlation coefficient between these two alternative formalization measures of 0.82. 
7 Comparable figures for the United States are 55.4 percent according to the latest US Census.    11 
self-employment, in firms with 2-10 employees, and in larger firms in each sector. While 
in principle, we have information for 40 sectors, we drop information for sectors with less 
than 80 observations per year in the data. Also, as customary in the literature of financial 
constraints and firm growth (see, e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988), financial 
industries (financial intermediation, activities auxiliary, insurance and pension fund) are 
excluded from the sample. After this filtering, we have data for 25 sectors for  the self-
employment group, 26 sectors for the 2-10 employees size category, and 40 sectors for 
the larger firm group.   
 
The second foundation of our data work consisted of building sector-specific measures of 
external financing dependence following the classic methodology of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). In their work, the authors compute indices only for manufacturing. In order to 
obtain similar economy-wide measures that can be mapped into the PNAD’s double-digit 
aggregation level (as per the ISIC rev3 classification), we use information obtained from 
the sample of firms in the S&P 1500 index  (available at  Bloomberg)  for the years 
between 2002 and 2006. Financial dependency indices are computed as the ratio between 
capital expenditures minus cash from operations (use of external finance) and capital 
expenditures. As in Rajan and Zingales (2008), for each firm the index is calculated first 
as the sum of external finance over 2002-2006 divided by the sum of capital expenditures 
in the same period. Then, the industry sector median is calculated again aggregating at a 
2 digit classification (ISIC rev 3). As discussed in Section 5, we also compute a coarser 
discrete measure of financial dependency by assigning a value of 1 if the sector index lies   12 
above the mean, and 0 otherwise, to capture sectors with a financial dependency above 
and below the mean, respectively.  
 
Finally, we use a classic measure of financial deepening at the country-year level which 
is total domestic bank credit to GDP. For the reasons discussed later, we break this 
aggregate credit variable into credit to the private sector as a whole (i.e., including firms 
and households  but excluding the government) and  credit to private firms only (i.e. 
excluding households and government). To gauge financial deepening more broadly, we 
also consider measures of the cost of credit such as interest rates and banking spreads, as 
well as real GDP growth, real exchange rate changes and inflation as additional controls. 
All financial sector and macro data were obtained from the Brazilian Planning Ministry 
Research Institute (http://ipeadata.gov.br), with the exception of the real effective 
exchange rate index which is a series internally produced at the IMF. 
 
3. Stylized Facts 
 
Figure 1 shows that formalization – as measured by the share of workers with carteira 
assinada – has risen significantly since 2003, from 38% to nearly 45% of the urban labor 
force by early 2008. One observes a similar upward trend using the alternative definition 
of formality based on the share of workers who contribute to social security (Figure 2). 
Using either definition, the rate of formality has displayed a clear upward trend since 
2004. 
   13 
As mentioned above, this upward trend in formality takes place pari pasu with an upward 
trend in credit growth. The more widespread use of banking financing by the private 
sector since 2004 is clearly depicted in Figure 3, which shows that the ratio of overall 
credit to the private sector (i.e. including both credit to firms and households) rose 
relative GDP over the past five year, reaching an all time high by early 2008 of nearly 
38%. No less importantly, credit to firms has also risen sharply over the same period. 
Starting from a much lower base, it reached 22% of GDP by early 2008 from a trough of 
15% around mid-2003.  Since real GDP growth accelerated during this period, this 
implies that credit growth has been especially strong, expanding at double-digit annual 
rates. 
 
This credit expansion has taken place at declining interest rates. Not only did the policy-
controlled money market rate declined, but so did lending rates charged by banks to the 
average borrower. No less importantly, the banking intermediation spread (lending-
deposit rate)  has declined almost monotonically during the period, suggesting 
improvements in credit risk and/or intermediation efficiency – factors that have typically 
accounted for high banking spreads in Brazil as well as much of Latin America (Gelos, 
2008). This juxtaposition of declining rates and lending growth suggests that rightward 
shifts in the supply of loans are driving these trends. The result has been better terms of 
access by firms to formal banking credit. 
 
Thus, a first inspection in trends in credit conditions and formal employment provides  
prima-facie evidence for a positive relationship between the two. Further, given that the   14 
credit boom is seemingly associated with expansionary shifts in credit supply due to 
mostly (if not entirely) exogenous factors - such as declining policy-controlled interest 
rates, favourable international liquidity, and improvements in intermediation efficiency 
(all facilitated by liberalization policies), this suggests that the causality runs from better 
terms of access to credit markets to employment formalization.  
 
In practice, growing formalization of firms and labor arrangements  may take place 
through a complex mix of channels operating “within” and “between” sectors as well as 
across firm sizes. First,  informal firms may  decide to become legal, and being legal 
implies complying with firm and workers registration as well as profit and labor tax 
obligations. Second, formal firms may expand faster and hence displace informal firms. 
Third, formal firms (in the sense that they are registered or pay some taxes) engaged in 
informal practices (in the sense that do not comply with all their obligations) may 
regularize these practices so as to avoid the risk of “being caught”, which can potentially 
undermine their terms of access to formal credit. Fourth, even if firms could obtain credit 
when informal, increased access to credit allows them to grow;  this size effect  of 
abundant credit  in turn provides  incentives to become formal to the extent that 
enforcement increases with firm size (i.e. smaller firms are less likely to be “caught”). 
Available data for Brazil (as well for most other countries) do not allow us to directly 
measure the relative importance of these different channels. This is because one can only 
derive from the PNAD net flows by sector, rather than individual firms’ entry and exit 
(i.e. gross flows). Nor does the survey provide information on the age of the firm or on 
whether it began its life as an informal or formal establishment. Despite these limitations,   15 
we do glean useful information on the relative importance of some of these “within” and 
“between” effects from these data.  
 
Consider first the variations in formality rates across industries shown in Table 1. The 
expansion of formalization has been reasonably widespread across sectors, suggesting 
that much of the increase in aggregate formalization appears to have taken place via 
“within sector” effects. Yet, there are  also  important differences  across sectors. For 
example, taking the formalization of the contract (“carteira  assinada”) definition, the 
results suggest that formality rates ranged from a low of 30% or so in some service 
activities to a high of 97 % in the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel.  The data also indicates that this broad picture is robust to the measure of 
informality adopted.  
 
Further insights into the channels driving formalization during the period can be gleaned 
from a more disaggregated look at the composition of employment. We start with a 
simple decomposition exercise by firm size. This is important in light of a distinguished 
literature on financial constraints and economic growth that argues that smaller firms are 
typically the more constrained ones and hence typically have more to gain from the 
expansion of  credit supply  (e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002). The extent to which the growth in aggregate formality is associated with shifts in 
employment shares across distinct firm size categories (“between” effect) vs. shifts in 
formalization inside the various firm size segments (“within” effect) can be derived as   16 
follows. Let F be aggregate formal employment while E is total employment (including 
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where superscripts L and S stand for total formal employment in large and small firms 
respectively. Dividing and multiplying the first term of the right hand side by
L E  and the 
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The first and the third terms on the right of (2) account for the growth formalization 
within each of the two size categories, whereas the second and fourth terms account for 
changes in the shares of employment between large and small firms. It is easy to see that 
further size breakdowns add extra pairs of terms to the left of (2). 
 
Table 2 presents the results using both definitions of formality (“carteira” and social 
security contributions). Because the self-employed do not have a labor contract (i.e. they 
are  not employees), this category is excluded from the  breakdown by the “carteira” 
definition. Since the PNAD does not allow further size breakdowns for firms with more   17 
than 11 employees, then our working definition of small firms comprises those which 
employ between 2 and 10 employees, while the definition of larger firm comprises those 
that employ 11 or more employees. 
 
Starting with the “carteira” definition,  it is clear that much of the  increase in 
formalization is due to a positive “within effect” among smaller and larger firms. This 
within effect is of similar magnitude across the two size categories (41.6 percent and 40.1 
percent)  over the entire 2002-2007 period. It  became  stronger during the 2004-2007 
credit boom, rising to 44.7 and 43.8 percent, respectively. This is broadly corroborated by 
the decomposition based on the “social security” definition, with the intermediate and 
larger firm sizes posting the highest gains in 2004-2007 (35.1 percent and 33.1 percent, 
respectively). This contrasts with the weaker formalization effect of 6.7 percent within 
the self-employed category. 
 
But an important contribution to formalization also comes from shifts in relative firm size 
– the “between” effect. In the first part of the period, this effect was in fact predominant 
and  stemming from the growing  share of larger firms, i.e., the size segment where 
formalization is higher to start with. Interestingly, this “between” stemming from the 
relative expansion of larger firms  becomes  weaker in the latter part of the period 
(particularly in 2006-2007 when credit expansion sharply accelerates). The flip side of 
these developments is that the smaller firm size segment diminishes its share in total 
employment.  In particular,  the reduction of informality has been associated with the   18 
relative decline of the self-employment category throughout 2002-2007.
8
One should also bear in mind that the computed percentage shares in Table 2 refer to a 
net effect. In other words, to the extent that easier credit access allows a growing number 
of firms to move from the smaller to the larger size segment, this may well account for 
such a skewness effect in the size distribution. Since the available PNAD data does not 
allow us to pin down gross flows, it remains a matter of conjecture as to which effect 
predominates  –  i.e., whether smaller firms are disappearing and having their market 
 Similarly the 
share of employment in the middle-size segment has also contracted during 2002-2007 
but less so in 2004-2007 and particularly in 2007. This suggests that as the credit boom 
matures, there appears to be some trickle-down effect, reducing the speed of the loss of 
participation of smaller firms in total formal employment. 
 
While the overall negative (albeit decelerating)  between effect for smaller firms would 
seemingly go against  the evidence that smaller firms tend to be the ones which are more 
credit constrained, care needs to be taken about interpreting this. First because the larger 
firm segment as defined as those encompassing firms with 11 or more employees still 
comprises a sufficiently large number of small and medium firms which are typically 
credit constrained. Second, because, even though larger firms are typically less credit 
constrained, larger firms in emerging economies in Latin America are still small in 
worldwide terms (Herrera and Lora, 2006). So, these larger firms still stand to benefit 
greatly from easier credit access enabling them to expand market shares. Third, because 
we need controls for other effects that affect size. We will consider them in Section 5.  
 
                                                 
8 In fact, this relative reduction is observed every single year between 2002 and 2007.   19 
shares taken over by previously existing larger firms or simply that many smaller firms 
are rapidly growing in size and joining the rank of larger firms.  
 
In sum, evidence from these simple descriptive exercises with the raw data indicates that 
better terms of access to formal credit are helping foster aggregate formalization of the 
labor force. This favorable credit effect appears to be taking place on two fronts. One is 
by motivating formerly informal firms to go formal, particularly for firms with more than 
one employee. The other front is by increasing the weight of larger firms –traditionally 
with a higher propensity of being formal. In turn, the latter effect may be driven either by 
credit allowing small firms to grow or by credit boosting growth among already formal 
and larger firms.  
 
4. Econometric Evidence 
We now formally test whether economic sectors that are typically more dependent on 
external financing (which, as discussed above, means domestic bank credit) are the ones 
where formal employment expands faster as the terms of access to bank credit improve. 
To gauge the extent to which different sectors have different degrees of financial 
dependence, we follow the classic methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), where the 
degree of financial dependence (hereafter FD) of each sector is measured based on US 
data. The underlying assumption is that because the United States has the world’s most 
developed financial system, the observed degrees of financial dependence of different 
sectors in the United States reflect their “true” financial dependence as determined by 
technological factors. While the Rajan-Zingales methodology has been used to pin down   20 
the determinants of per capita income growth across countries, the novelty in our 
empirical testing strategy  is to apply  their identification approach  to examine 
determinants of labor formalization rates, in this case across a host of sectors in one 
country.  
 
As in Rajan and Zingales (1998), the sector-level measure of financial dependence is then 
interacted with the economy-wide measures of financial deepening discussed in Section 
2, i.e., bank credit to the private sector over GDP or credit to private firms to GDP. The 
reason we also take into account the first measure is because it is possible that firms use 
other categories of credit not formally defined as “business credit” for their financing; in 
this case, the broader category of bank credit would be the more appropriate measure. 
 
As discussed above, firm size dimension appears to be crucial to the dynamics of the 
relationship between access to formal credit and formalization of the labor force. So, in 
addition to results for the overall rate of formalization, and as in the simple 
decomposition exercise of Section 2, the econometric estimates presented below will also 
distinguish formalization by size categories. Among other things, such a size breakdown 
also helps ensure that our financial dependency variable is not (or at least not entirely) 
capturing size effects. As above, results are presented for categories within salaried 
employment (firms 2-10 employees and firms of 11 or more workers) as well as 
separately for the self-employed.   
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To test whether such changes in formal employment within each firm size category have 
been stronger in sectors which are more financially dependent of external resources, we 
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,    (3) 
 
where j, t, C represent sector, year and firm size category respectively. The dependent 
variable corresponds to the formalization share in size category c. FD stands for the 
Rajan-Zingales index explained above, whereas  t δ  and  j δ  are year and sector dummies.  
 
In addition, to gauge the extent to which employment shifts across firm size categories 
(between effects) are stronger in more financially dependent sectors, we also estimate the 
following model where the dependent variable is defined as the share of employment of 
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Before moving onto the results, two points should be born in mind. One is that the 
FD*credit variable is strongly exogenous to the individual sector, since the FD variable is 
constructed on the basis of US (rather than Brazilian) data and aggregate credit is mostly 
exogenous to each sector, especially at the finer (2-digit) level of disaggregation we work 
with. Second, it is worth noting that since  we construct our dependent variables as   22 
averages within each size-sector cell, and because we drop cells based on less than 80 
(unweighted) observations, the number of observations in our formalization regressions 
of equation (3) varies by firm size. Instead, for the set of regressions corresponding to 
equation (4) we only include sectors for which the number of unweighted observations is 
more than 80 across all firm sizes. This is because otherwise the sum of the shares of 
employment by sector across regressions would not add up to one.  
 
The regressions were estimated by Generalized Least Square (GLS) allowing  the 
standard error to follow a first-order autocorrelation specific to each sector. It should also 
be noted that the use of time effects is particularly important in this context since among 
other common aggregate influences (like real GDP growth), they are also  capturing 
common improvements in regulatory enforcement which may have been important in 
Brazil during this period.  
 
We start by testing the overall relationship between financial deepening and 
formalization without breaking down by size, i.e., pooling all firm sizes together.  Table 3 
presents the results. They clearly  indicate that formalization generally increases with 
financial deepening, and with coefficients that are very similar across the two definitions 
of formalization (“carteira” and “social security”). An increase in aggregate credit to 
firms/GDP by 10 percentage points relative to average would increase formalization in 
the most financially dependent sector (air transport – see Table 1) relative to the least 
financially dependent sector (manufacture of paper and paper products – see Table 1) by 
some 6.5 percentage points [=(1.27-(-1.67))*0.1*0.22].   23 
 
The results also indicate that the effect is about twice as strong for the credit to firms 
variable than for the variable credit to the overall private sector (i.e. firms+households).. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms’ dependence on external financing is the 
key engine of formalization, rather than household dependence on credit in general. In 
other words, an increased supply of firm credit creates better incentives for formalization 
than consumption credit. Thus, the difference between the two types of credit often lies in 
the fact that,  while firm owners may obtain consumption credit quite easily without 
presenting any financial statement or information on the legal status of the firm, obtaining 
firm credit – which is generally offered at much better terms as Brazilian data clearly 
indicates — requires presenting detailed information on firms’ activities and legal status.  
Thus, the strength of the credit-formalization channel under consideration clearly 
depends on the formalization status of the firm being a pre-condition for credit.  We 
return to the implications of this key result in Section 6.  
 
Tables  4  and  5  provide evidence on the extent to which formalization responds to 
aggregate credit availability  across distinct size segments.  Table  4  starts with the 
“carteira” definition of formality for which only two size categories are available (since, 
as noted above, self-employed workers are not in salaried employment and therefore do 
not have “carteira assinada”). The results indicate that greater access to formal credit 
increases the probability of formalization both for smaller and larger firms. All effects are 
statistically significant at 1 percent.   These results are consistent with the existence of a 
strong positive “within” effect of an expansion of credit supply or financial deepening as   24 
usually measured on formal employment on all firm size categories. As before, effects 
are twice as large for firm credit as for overall credit, and tend to be larger for smaller 
firms, lending support to the notion that smaller firms benefit more from increased access 
to credit.  
 
Table 5 replicates the exercise for the social security definition of formality, which allows 
us to gauge what happens to the self-employed category. As in the “carteira” definition, 
the results point to a reasonably strong and statistically significant effect of credit 
availability on labor formalization for firms of 2-10 and larger firms. In contrast, the 
effects for the self-employed are statistically insignificant, albeit positive throughout.  
 
As stated in the introduction, increased formalization due to increased credit may be 
outweighed by firms shifting into larger size segments of the market and leaving their 
previous size segment more dominated by informal firm. This may be particularly the 
case for self-employed workers. Yet, it may well be that this group is notoriously difficult 
to formalize. Given a strong relationship between size and productivity (see, e.g., IDB, 
2009  for recent evidence and further references), the cost-benefit calculation for the 
smallest firms may be strongly tilted against  formalization.    This is the conclusion 
reached by Bruhn (2008) after evaluating the formalization outcomes of a business 
registration simplification program in Mexico. While she found that the program 
contributed to increased formalization, only very small  effects were  found among 
informal own-account firms. Nonetheless, since the contribution to overall formalization 
of within effects for the self-employed category is small, as seen in Table 2, this means   25 
that we are not  leaving unexplained a large share of shifts in aggregate labor 
formalization.   
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the “between” effect regressions highlighted in 
the decomposition scheme of equation (1). The dependent variable in the regression is 
now the ratio of employment in a certain firm size category to total employment. As 
such, the respective regressions capture the effect of credit availability on the distribution 
of employment across the three firm size categories. Notice that, as mentioned above, 
regressions only include sectors for which enough observations are encountered to 
compute reliable employment ratios in each size category. The results suggest that credit 
availability has an ambiguous between effect: none of the coefficients is statistically 
significant at conventional levels with the exception of one case, that referring to self 
employment and using as the measure of financial deepening credit to GDP. The results 
suggest that, if anything, increased access to credit reduces the share of the self-employed 
and increases the share of workers in firms of two or more employees. This inference is 
somewhat reinforced once further controls are introduced in the regressions as shown in 
Section 5.   
 
This weaker effect of credit on the size distribution of employment is consistent with the 
presence of offsetting effects on the entry to and exit from each size group: on the one 
hand, increased access to credit may have motivated some formerly salaried workers to 
step into self-employment. On the other hand, some self-employed workers may have 
benefit from increased access to credit,  hiring some employees and  turning into   26 
intermediate size formal firms, thus contributing to reducing the share of employment in 
self-employment activities.  The estimates suggest that on average the net effect of these 
two forces is negative, with a net exit of workers from self-employment to salaried jobs.  
Similar effects may be occurring for intermediate size firms, while some self-employed 
workers may have hired additional workers and turned into small firms, this effect may 
be offset by the move of some firms initially in the intermediate size category to the 
larger size category. The data suggest that these countervailing effects may be canceling 
each other out to a large extent. Since our data only captures the net effects, credit is thus 
bound to appear as explaining relatively little of the changes in formality associated with 
shifts in the size distribution of firms.  
 
Once again, while this latter result may be read as inconsistent with the literature on 
credit constraints and the size distribution of firms (smaller firms are the ones typically to 
expand more rapidly with releasing of such constraints), care must be taken in doing so. 
As noted in Section 3, this is because our larger firm segment also comprises a number of 
firms which are still small by standard metrics. In addition, even the largest firms in 
emerging markets are typically far more credit constrained than those in the US market – 
the focus of that literature – simply because emerging market countries themselves face 
much more stringent credit constraints overall. Be that as it may, the finding that the bulk 
of the financial deepening effect on formalization is working within the various firm size 
segments  is striking,  and  has not been documented elsewhere  to the best of our 
knowledge.  
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5. Robustness   
The results so far indicate that our findings are robust to the use of different formality 
measures (formality of the contract versus social security contributions) and different 
measures of credit (credit to the private sector versus credit to firm). We have also 
shown, however, that the effect of credit on formalization is stronger in the case of firm 
credit and that this is important supportive evidence for our hypothesis. 
 
In this section we report results when we: (i) use a coarse index of financial dependence 
based on a dummy variable; (ii) try alternative measures of financial development and 
cost of credit; (iii) weight sectors by the number of observations and eliminate outlier 
sectors; and (iv) consider further controls. 
 
Starting with (i), one might conjecture that  the Rajan-Zingales FD ranking  is highly 
demanding in terms of sectoral disaggregation and that the specifics of such ranking of 
financial dependence may not be entirely appropriate an economy such as Brazil, which 
is structurally quite distinct economy from the United States. With this potential criticism 
in mind, we re-run the regressions of Tables 3 to 5 replacing the FD index by a dummy 
variable, defined as 1 if the sector has an above-average FD index and zero otherwise. 
The results are reported in Table 7. The broad thrust of the results is that the financial 
dependence-financial deepening interaction is a positive determinant of formalization, 
although the coefficients are less precisely estimated, particularly for the 2-10 workers 
size group.  Yet, as will be seen below, the significance of the coefficients on  mid-  28 
segment of the size group using the FD dummy is re-instated once other alternative 
measures of financial deepening are considered. 
 
Second, we  assess whether our results hold when alternative measures of financial 
deepening are considered. We start with the money market interest rate as a measure of 
financial development instead of the ratio of aggregate bank credit to GDP. Since the 
money market interest rate in an emerging economy responds to a host of domestic policy 
as well as international developments such as global liquidity conditions, it is arguably a 
more exogenous determinant of credit availability and hence of financial deepening; it is 
also a more direct measure of the cost of credit. The results, presented in columns 1 and 2 
of  Table  8A, indicate findings  which are very similar to  those  found with the  other 
measures of credit in the baseline regressions of Tables 3 to 5: that is, a decline in interest 
rates is associated with increased formalization of workers employed in firms of two or 
more employees, with stronger results in the intermediate size. As before, the estimated 
coefficients also take on the expected sign among the self-employed, though they are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Coefficients are also very similar in size 
and significance regardless of the measure of external dependency used.  
 
Regarding the allocation of employment across firm size, results are again suggestive that 
a reduction in interest rates promotes a shift of employment from self to salaried 
employment (Table 8B), but the results are only statistically significant when the FD 
dummy for high/low external dependency (instead of the finer R-Z ranking) is used. 
Table 9 shows that similar inferences emerge once we consider the intermediation spread   29 
(the difference between the average bank lending rate to firms and the money market 
interest rate) as a measure of financial deepening.  To the extent that intermediation 
spreads reflect a combination of factors related to the level of money market rate, 
perceived lending risk, taxes, and the efficiency in the intermediation technology – all of 
which are arguably weakly exogenous to loan demand at the very least – they provide 
further  indication  that our  baseline  results  on significance in Tables 3-5  are not 
undermined by endogeneity biases. 
 
Turning to the treatment of sectors, rather than eliminating sectors with less than 80 
observations,  we investigate whether results change if in the formalization rate 
specifications we weigh each observation by the share of total observations in that sector. 
i.e. we assign higher weight to sectors with more observations and where the rates of 
formalization are more precisely estimated. The results are practically identical to those 
presented in tables 3-6 and so are not reported to conserve on space, but are available 
from the authors upon request. 
 
Finally, we control for a common set of macroeconomic variables to which all sectors are 
exposed,  instead  of  introducing  time  effects  as in  previous regressions. This has the 
advantage of allowing us to recover the full effects of an increase in overall credit on 
formality which in our baseline specification was absorbed by the time dummies. It also 
allows gauging how formalization and changes in relative market shares by firm size 
groups are affected by key macro variables such as real GDP growth and real exchange   30 
rate  variation.  The  results  are reported in Table 10.
9
                                                 
9 We have also included inflation as a co-variate but the results on the relevant credit variables remain 
unchanged. A downside of including inflation is its colinearity with the real exchange rate. The coefficients 
on both variables are statistically significant in the overwhelming majority of the specifications. 
  Clearly, the positive  effects of 
financial dependence and availability of formal credit on formalization continue to hold 
in the presence of such controls. In fact, the respective coefficients are  of  a  similar 
magnitude  to  those  in the baseline specification  of tables 5 to 6.  Regarding the 
significance of these controls, an interesting effect is that a rise of real GDP growth or a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate (measured so that an increase of RER corresponds 
to an appreciation) is  associated with a increase in the   formalization of the self-
employed. In contrast, a real appreciation allows large firms to grow relative to smaller 
firms. Thus, the introduction of such controls help explain some of the between effects 
highlighted in Table 2.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper assesses the potential of an empirically unexplored channel to explain changes 
in labor formalization and in informality more generally. The key hypothesis it tests is 
whether  the combination of financial dependence and greater availability of cheaper 
credit (financial deepening)  increases  firms’ incentives to become formal. This is so 
because formalization buys access to such an expanded supply of formal credit and thus 
saves on the higher costs and legal insecurity of informal credit markets.  Given the well-
known literature that relates credit constraints and firm size, we also explore how access 
to credit changes formalization rates within firm size categories, as well as shifts in the 
composition of employment across size categories.    31 
Our results indicate that the main effect of credit on formalization takes place via an 
incentive to formalize labor arrangements within each sector. Generally, we find that, as 
the aggregate supply of formal bank credit increases leading to financial deepening, there 
is a significantly faster increase in the formalization rate in those sectors which are more 
dependent on external funds.  At the same time, the effect of financial deepening on 
formalization via changes in the distribution size of firms is less clear-cut: there is 
evidence that the self-employment segment shrinks and that the middle-sized segment 
expands but the latter effect is not statistically significant. This is consistent with the 
predictions of a model where net employment effects depend on the effect of credit on 
entry and exit: it is possible that greater credit availability drives the self-employed to 
grow into the middle-sized category, whereas many firms in the middle-sized segment 
grow into the larger size segment.  Whether this has been the case cannot be tested on the 
basis of our data, since it does not have information on gross employment flows.  In 
addition, as mentioned above, the coarse disaggregation of firm sizes in the survey 
cautions against making stronger statements about size effects. In short, whether  the 
expansion of the share of employment in larger firms is given by the growth of initially 
small firms or by the growth of initially larger firms is a matter left for future research. 
Likewise, the extent to which the increase in formalization within the various sectors 
stems from unregistered informal firms that go formal, as opposed to already registered 
firms that from a point in time onward regularize their tax and regulatory obligations, or 
from new firms that enter the market as formal from inception, is also a question that 
available data does not allow us to discern.  As such,  gauging the  various micro 
mechanisms through which financial development helps foster  formalization  via the   32 
potentially complex dynamics of firm entry and exit and size effects is an important topic 
left for future research once data are available.  
 
Nonetheless, some key practical implications can be derived from this paper’s results. 
One is that the gains of an increased supply of credit are likely to go beyond the non-
trivial benefits of having a higher share of the labor force in regular jobs and thus able to 
afford better health and pension benefits and thus reduce potentially large social liabilities 
to the government. In addition to these very tangible and immediate social benefits, there 
is also considerable evidence that formalization also leads to better resource allocation 
and hence to higher productivity and long-term income growth which adds to welfare 
(Djankov et al., 2002; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; IDB, 2009). In the particular case of 
Brazil, such links between informality and economic growth have been forcefully argued 
elsewhere, and in recent years the relative size of informal economy has been deemed to 
explain up to 30 percent of the productivity gap between the United States and Brazil 
(e.g. Farell, 2001; Capp et al., 2005). Therefore, understanding what drives informality is 
a critical issue in financial and economic development.  
 
Another implication of our results pertains to the design of public programs of credit 
subsidies  to small enterprises, such as the much touted micro-credit  programs in 
developing countries. If such programs are designed without the requirement that such 
firms comply with a host of regulations and financial obligations associated with formal 
employment, then the disciplinary role of access to formal credit in curbing informality is 
short-circuited.  To the extent that non-market based restraints to informality do not   33 
appear to be extremely effective practice, short-circuiting such a market-based 
disciplinary device may be sub-optimal. So, the design of such highly popular programs 
needs careful consideration in this light.  
 
Last but not least, our findings have implications for macroeconomic and financial sector 
policy management. Brazil has been one of a handful of emerging markets that combined 
financial liberalization with tighter liquidity regulations and conservative monetary and 
fiscal policies. Such policies – to the extent that they are conducive to great credit market 
efficiency and less volatile financial market conditions – appeared to have contributed to 
reducing  informality  by lowering the cost  of credit to formal firms. Since lower 
informality has substantial micro and macro economic benefits, this adds to the 
desirability of such policies beyond the more standard macro arguments in their defense. 
This seems to encapsulate a valuable lesson not only for Brazil – looking back at its own 
pre-1990s record of unsound macro and regulatory policies –  but also for other 
developing countries.  
 
In  summary,  the lack of  attention  by the literatures on  financial development and 
financial dependence to what drives the formalization of firms and employment relations 
has  left  a  wide  gap  on  our understanding of the links of financial development and 
economic growth. This is an important gap which we believe future research should seek 
to fill. Further work looking at the experiences of other countries with distinct financial 
and productive structures,  as well as distinct  legal frameworks,  should  yield further 
insights on this issue and perhaps generalize some of our findings.   34 
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Figure 1. Brazil: Share of Urban Workers with Formal Employment Contrato ("carteira")
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Figure 3. Brazil: Bank Credit
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Table 1: Level and Change in the Share of Formal to Total Employment in Brazil and the Rajan-Zingales Financial Dependence (FD) Index 
at a Two-digit Sectoral Disagregation
FD index
isic_2dig Sector 2002 2007 % Change 2002 2007 % Change
13 Mining of metal ores 84.7% 81.1% -3.7% 76.0% 71.5% -4.5% -0.54
14 Other mining and quarrying 54.5% 75.8% 21.3% 41.9% 67.8% 25.9% 0.25
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 77.9% 80.3% 2.5% 65.8% 67.2% 1.4% -0.02
17 Manufacture of textiles 77.0% 78.8% 1.8% 46.3% 48.2% 2.0% -0.43
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 62.5% 65.7% 3.1% 37.8% 43.1% 5.3% 0.09
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 79.1% 80.8% 1.7% 73.7% 77.2% 3.4% 0.25
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;  69.0% 67.8% -1.2% 60.1% 58.1% -2.1% 0.51
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 83.6% 88.7% 5.1% 80.1% 88.2% 8.1% -0.04
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 74.5% 76.4% 1.9% 67.4% 69.6% 2.2% -1.68
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 97.0% 96.8% -0.2% 96.4% 93.9% -2.6% 0.05
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 81.3% 87.2% 5.9% 79.1% 83.5% 4.5% -0.17
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 87.4% 90.5% 3.1% 85.5% 87.9% 2.4% -0.96
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 68.9% 70.2% 1.3% 64.3% 64.7% 0.4% 0.13
27 Manufacture of basic metals 87.5% 93.5% 6.0% 83.2% 90.6% 7.4% 0.33
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 75.2% 81.8% 6.6% 63.0% 71.8% 8.9% 0.51
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 86.4% 89.4% 3.0% 82.5% 85.4% 2.9% -0.20
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 85.8% 87.8% 1.9% 77.9% 83.9% 6.0% -0.23
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 83.2% 90.4% 7.2% 82.4% 88.5% 6.1% 0.07
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 82.9% 77.4% -5.5% 69.6% 71.1% 1.5% 0.40
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 93.2% 92.9% -0.3% 91.1% 90.0% -1.2% -0.45
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 83.9% 88.0% 4.1% 82.7% 84.8% 2.1% 0.69
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 63.7% 68.2% 4.4% 48.7% 45.2% -3.4% -0.59
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 90.6% 94.6% 4.1% 90.8% 93.4% 2.6% 1.07
45 Construction 44.3% 51.7% 7.3% 28.5% 32.1% 3.6% 0.08
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 57.8% 62.6% 4.7% 48.4% 54.0% 5.6% 1.12
53 Wholesale trade, retail  and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 66.9% 71.8% 4.8% 47.6% 53.1% 5.5% 0.46
55 Hotels and restaurants 59.9% 61.5% 1.6% 44.3% 48.2% 4.0% 0.84
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 70.6% 75.3% 4.7% 51.8% 55.6% 3.8% 0.53
62 Air transport 96.0% 94.2% -1.8% 90.3% 85.4% -4.9% 1.27
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 70.4% 76.0% 5.6% 56.0% 65.7% 9.7% -0.62
64 Post and telecommunications 80.9% 84.9% 4.0% 77.9% 80.5% 2.6% 0.16
70 Real estate activities 78.6% 82.1% 3.5% 73.1% 76.8% 3.6% -1.55
72 Computer and related activities 73.8% 70.0% -3.8% 62.9% 61.0% -2.0% -1.30
74 Other business activities 73.7% 77.9% 4.2% 68.0% 71.6% 3.6% -0.67
75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 63.3% 75.7% 12.4% 72.5% 83.0% 10.5% 1.26
80 Education 71.4% 73.9% 2.6% 66.0% 68.4% 2.4% -0.14
85 Health and social work 80.3% 80.1% -0.2% 73.6% 75.1% 1.5% 0.13
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 87.2% 83.6% -3.6% 86.3% 85.1% -1.3% -0.10
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 49.6% 50.5% 0.9% 41.7% 43.7% 2.0% -0.86
93 Other service activities 31.8% 33.7% 1.9% 19.0% 20.7% 1.7% 0.05
Source: Authors' computations from PNAD 2002 and 2007 and from US firm level data from S&P 1500 index (available at Bloomberg). See Section II in the main text for specifics. 
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 Table 2:  Decomposition of aggregate labor formalization between self-employed workers, small and larger Firms
(percent)
This Table provides a decomposition of changes in the aggregate ratio of Formal Employment to Total Employment Using Equations (1) and (2) in the main text. It decomposes
changes in formalization as a sum of effects within and between each size category (self-employed, Small Firms, and Larger firms) over distinct time periods, with "SE" denoting  
self-employment, "S" denoting firms of 2-10 employees, and "L" denoting firms with 11 or more employees. (F/E)j refers to the formality rate for size category j. Ej/E refers to the 
employment share in size category j.  For the formality measure "carteira assinada", employment is split into workers employed in small (2-10) and larger firms (>11) only, since
category self-employment is not included because "carteira assinada" only refers to employees.
Labor Contract Definition 
("carteira assinada")
∆ (F/E) == ∆  (F/E)s
 (Es/E) ∆ (Es/E) (F/E)s ∆ (F/E)L
 (EL/E) ∆ (EL/E) (F/E)L
2002-2007 100 41.6 -22.0 40.1 40.3
2002-2004 100 33.5 -38.6 32.2 72.9
2004-2007 100 44.7 -14.1 43.8 25.7
Social Security Definition:
("contribuicao a previdencia)
∆ (F/E) == ∆ (F/E)se(Ese/E) ∆ (Ese/E) (F/E)se ∆ (F/E)s (Es/E) ∆ (Es/E) (F/E)s ∆ (F/E)L (EL/E) ∆ (EL/E) (F/E)L
2002-2007 100 5.4 -8.2 30.5 -7.2 26.9 52.7
2002-2004 100 1.5 -14.3 17.7 -15.3 11.8 98.5
2004-2007 100 6.7 -5.7 35.1 -3.8 33.1 34.6
Source: Authors' computations based on PNAD.   40 
        Table 3. Formal Employment and Financial Dependence: Panel Regressions without size break
This table reports GLS regressions of the share of formal to total employment in industry j on time and industry dummies plus the interaction of 
term of external financial dependence by industry with aggregate credit to GDP. For each regresion only the coefficient on the interaction term
 is reported.  The panel regression spans 40 sectors over the period 2002-2007.
Dependent variable: Formal employment/ total employment 
Formal employment Credit to private sector/GDP Credit to firms/GDP Observations Sectors
definition:
0.1079*** 0.2161** 240 40
Social security (0.037) (0.098)
0.1025*** 0.2189*** 240 40
Carteira (0.027) (0.061)
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Table 4: Formal Employment and Financial Dependence: Panel Regressions of Within Size Effects
(Employment Registration or "Cartera" Definition of Formalization)
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of formal to total employment in industry j , and
formal employment is defined as employment of those reported to be registered workers with the labor ministry ("carteira"). 
The explanatory variables include interaction of  term of external financial dependence by industry with  aggregate credit
to GDP as in equation 3 of the main text. Panel regressions were run for each for each firm size segment (the one-person firm or 
"self-employed" is excluded because he/she does not have "carteira" by definition). Only the coefficient on the financial dependence
on the financial dependence*credit interaction term is reported.  The panel spans the period 2002-2007.
Dependent variable: Formal employment/Total Employment 
Credit to private sector/GDP Credit to firms/GDP Observations Sectors
Firms with 2-10 employees 0.2067*** 0.4218*** 156 26
(0.0446) (0.1146)
Firms with more than  0.1111*** 0.2168*** 240 40
11 employees (0.0192) (0.0575)
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Table 5: Formal Employment and Financial Dependence: Panel Regressions of Within Size Effects
(Social Security Definition of Formality)
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of formal to total employment in industry j , and
formal employment is defined as employment of those reported to be contributors to social security. The explanatory variables include
time and industry dummies plus the interaction term of external financial dependence index by industry with aggregate credit 
to GDP as in equation 3 in main text. For each panel regression, the sample was broken down in the three size segments reported.
Only the coefficient on the financial dependence*aggregate credit interaction term is reported.  The panel spans the period 2002-2007.
Dependent variable: Formal employment/total employment
Credit to private sector/GDP Credit to firms/GDP Observations Sectors
ISIC
Sel- employment 0.1309 0.3684 150 25
(0.1166) (0.2545)
Firms with 2-10 employees 0.1748*** 0.3438*** 156 26
(0.0520) (0.1294)
Firms with more than  0.1054*** 0.1996** 240 40
11 employees (0.0285) (0.0780)
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Table 6. Formal Employment and Financial Dependence: Panel Regressions of Between Size Effects
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of employment in industry j to total employment 
in all sectors. The explanatory variables include time and industry dummies plus the interaction term of  the external financial 
dependence index by industry with aggregate credit to GDP, as in equation 4 in main text. For each panel regression, 
the sample was broken down in the three size segments reported and two alternative indicators of credit were considered 
(private sector including households and excluding households, i.e., with firms only). Only the coefficient on the financial 
dependence*aggregate credit interaction term is reported.  The panel spans the period 2002-2007.
Dependent variable: Employment in the respective firm size segment/total employment
Credit to private sector/GDP Credit to firms/GDP Observations Sectors
Self- employment -0.0848* -0.1470 150 25
(0.0475) (0.1120)
Firms with 2-10 employees 0.0353 0.0941 150 25
(0.0346) (0.0754)
Firms with more than  0.0448 0.0526 150 25
11 employees (0.0592) (0.1337)
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Table 7: Formal Employment and Financial Dependence: Panel Regressions of Within Sector Effects Using a Financial Dependence Dummy 
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of formal to total employment in industry j , and where 
formal employment is measured as either the "carteira" or the social security contribution definition. The explanatory variables include
time and industry dummies plus an interaction term consisting of the product of a dummy on financial dependence (1 for high financial dependence)
by industry times aggregate credit to GDP as in equation 3 in main text. For each panel regression, the sample was broken down in the three size 
segments reported. Only the coefficient on the financial dependence*aggregate credit interaction term is reported.  The panel spans 2002-2007.
Dependent variable: Formal employment/total employment
Credit to private sector/GDP Credit to firms/GDP Credit to private sector/GDP Credit to firms/GDP
Self-employment 0.1316 0.3102* _ _
(0.0833) (0.188)
Firms with 2-10 employees 0.1208 0.2105 0.1236 0.2324
(0.0846) (0.1999) (0.0935) (0.2142)
Firms with more than  0.1309*** 0.2554*** 0.0810** 0.1568*
11 employees (0.0308) (0.0867) (0.0356) (0.0879)
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
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Table 8. Panel Regressions Using the Money Market Interest Rate as the measure of Financial Deepening
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of formal to total employment in industry j  (Panel A), or the 
share of employment in sector j in the sum of employment in all sectors (Panel B). Formal employment is measured as either the "carteira" 
or the social security ("SS")contribution definition. The explanatory variables include time and industry dummies plus an interaction term 
which now uses the money market interest rate as a measure of financial deepening to be interacted the external financial dependency index
as in equation 3 in the main text. For each panel regression, the sample was broken down in the three size segments reported. 
Only the coefficient on the financial dependence*interest rate interaction term is reported.  The panel spans 2002-2007.
A. Dependent variable: Formal employment/Employees ("within'' regression)
Formalization_SS Formalization Carteira Formalization_SS Formalization Carteira # obs. Sectors
Self-employment  -0.0133 -0.0069 150 25
(0.1178) NA (0.1452) NA
Firms with 2-10 employees -0.2823*** -0.2513*** -0.2579*** -0.2536*** 156 26
(0.086) (0.0944) (0.053) (0.0592)
Firms with more than  -0.1514*** -0.0844** -0.1334*** -0.1261*** 240 40
11 employees (0.029) (0.0407) (0.0207) (0.0204)
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
Dependent variable: Employment in the respective firm size segment/total employment ("between regression")
# obs. Sectors
Self-employment  150 25
Firms with 2-10 employees 150 25
Firms with more than  150 25
11 employees
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
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Table 9. Panel Regressions Using Bank Intermediation Spread as the measure of Financial Deepening
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of formal to total employment in industry j  (Panel A), or the 
share of employment in sector j in the sum of employment in all sectors (Panel B). Formal employment is measured as either the "carteira" 
or the social security ("SS") contribution definition. The explanatory variables include time and industry dummies plus an interaction term 
which now uses the lending minus the money market interest spread as a measure of financial deepening to be interacted the external index
financial dependency as in equation 3 in the main text. For each panel regression, the sample was broken down in the three size segments 
reported. Only the coefficient on the financial dependence*interest rate interaction term is reported.  The panel spans 2002-2007.
A. Dependent variable: Formal employment/Employees ("within" regression)
Formalization_SS Formalization Carteira Formalization_SS Formalization Carteira # obs. Sectors
Self-employment  0.0029 0.0065 150 25
-0.0074 NA -0.0083 NA
Firms with 2-10 employees -0.0168*** -0.0147*** -0.0139*** -0.0123*** 156 26
-0.0049 -0.0048 -0.0039 -0.004
Firms with more than  -0.0089*** -0.0060*** -0.0066*** -0.0067*** 240 40
11 employees -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0011
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
Dependent variable: Employment in the respective firm size segment/total employment ("between regression")
# obs. Sectors
Self-employment  150 25
Firms with 2-10 employees 150 25
Firms with more than  150 25
11 employees







Dependence on external finance as Dummy Dependence on external finance as index
Each entry corresponds to a separate regression of formality rates in industry j on  time and industry dummies and the interaction of a measure of 
credit interacted with External Dependence by industry. For each regresion only the coefficient on the inter
Dependence on external finance as Dummy Dependence on external finance as index
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Table 10. Formal Employment and Financial Deepening: Other Controls
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of formal to total employment in industry j  (Panel A), or the 
share of employment in sector j in the sum of employment in all sectors (Panel B). Formal employment is measures as either the "carteira" 
or the social security ("SS") contribution definition. The explanatory variables include time and industry dummies plus an interaction term 
consisting of the ratio of aggregate credit to GDP as a measure of financial deepening which is interacted the external 
financial dependency index as in equation 3 in the main text. For each panel regression, the sample was broken down in the three size  
segments reported. The regressions also comprise real GDP growth and real exchange rate (%) change as additional controls.  The panel spans 2002-2007.
Dependent variable: Formal employment/Employees ("within" regression)
Credit/GDP FD*Credit/GDP GDP growth RER change Credit/GDP FD*Credit/GDP GDP growth RER change # obs. Sectors
Self-employment  0.1235 0.1338 0.3502*** -0.0265** 150 25
(-0.1272) (-0.1171) (-0.1059) (-0.0123) NA NA NA NA
Firms with 2-10 employees 0.3572*** 0.1780*** 0.0181 -0.011 0.3614*** 0.2082*** 0.0939 0.0166 156 26
(-0.1027) (-0.0461) (-0.2263) (-.0291) (-0.0787) (-0.0407) (-0.1491) (-0.0193)
Firms with more than  0.2391*** 0.1023*** 0.0108 0.0173 0.2176*** 0.1102*** 0.0159 0.0615*** 240 40
11 employees -0.1027 -0.0248 -0.0992 -0.0142 -0.0271 -0.0216 -0.071 -0.0083
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
Dependent variable: Employment in the respective firm size segment/total employment ("between regression")
Credit/GDP FD*Credit/GDP GDP growth RER change Credit/GDP FD*Credit/GDP GDP growth RER change # obs. Sectors
Self-employment  -0.2382*** -0.0801* -0.1349 0.0141 -0.4504*** -0.1379 -0.1515 0.0024 150 25
-0.0737 -0.0464 -0.1072 -0.0167 -0.1695 -0.1084 -0.1075 -0.0161
Firms with 2-10 employees 0.025 0.0385 -0.0591** -0.0508*** 0.0786 0.099 -0.0628** -0.0524*** 150 25
-0.0435 -0.0337 -0.026 -0.0047 -0.0975 -0.0734 -0.0261 -0.0047
Firms with more than  0.2046** 0.0388 0.0925 0.025* 0.3664* 0.0443 0.117 0.0371** 150 25
11 employees -0.0914 -0.0587 -0.1244 (0.015) -0.2103 -0.1337 -0.1288 -0.0154
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
Formalization_SS Formalization Carteira
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Table 11. Formal Employment and Financial Deepening: Weighted Generalized Least Square Regressions 
This table reports GLS regressions where the dependent variable is the share of formal to total employment in industry j  (Panel A), or the 
share of employment in sector j in the sum of employment in all sectors (Panel B). Formal employment is measured either the "carteira" 
or the social security ("SS") contribution definition. The explanatory variables include time and industry dummies plus an interaction term 
consisting of the ratio of aggregate credit to GDP as a measure of financial deepening which is interacted the external 
financial dependency index as in equation 3 in the main text. For each panel regression, the sample was broken down in the three size  
segments reported. In the regressions, each sector is weighed by the number of observations.  The panel spans 2002-2007.
A. Dependent variable: Formal employment/Employees ("within" regression)
Formalization_SS Formalization Carteira Formalization_SS Formalization Carteira # obs. Sectors
Self-employment  0.0272 0.0439 150 25
(-0.3424) NA (-0.0767) NA
Firms with 2-10 employees 0.0899* 0.0731 0.2437** 0.2279* 156 26
(-0.0478) (-0.0597) (-0.0975) (-0.1239)
Firms with more than  0.0662** 0.0425*** 0.1357* 0.0818** 240 40
11 employees (-0.0335) (-0.0159) (-0.0781) (-0.0367)
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
Dependent variable: Employment in the respective firm size segment/total employment ("between regression")
# obs. Sectors
Self-employment  150 25
Firms with 2-10 employees 150 25
Firms with more than  150 25
11 employees
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%
(-0.1212)
-0.1696*** -0.2768
Credit to Private Sector Credit to Firms
Credit to Private Sector Credit to Firms
(-0.065) (-0.1763)
0.1085*** 0.2170***
(-0.0264) (-0.0657)
0.0398 0.0436
(-0.0545)
 